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The Inclusionary Populist 
Communication Style on 




Communication is one of the core elements of populism, 
especially in social media. Through such digital platforms, 
political leaders can communicate directly with citizens and build 
both their discourse and their political leadership. Although the 
literature has so far identified the existence of a populist political 
communication style, the expansion of populism and its 
connection with social media are extending and diversifying the 
concept, as well as adding new repertoires. In order to analyse 
this, we propose a study of the communication strategy of the 
mayor of Barcelona, Ada Colau who, with a background of citizen 
activism, became mayor of the city in 2015 thanks to a political 
organisation situated as left populist. The methodology is based on 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the content of Colau’s 
Facebook profile. A total of 226 posts between 2015 and 2017 are 
analysed. The results make it possible to identify a new specific 
modality within the populist style of political communication, 
namely the inclusionary populist type. This focuses on issues 
related to defense of the rights of the weakest social groups and 
works within a framework of social justice and solidarity with 
others. Likewise, the study confirms how Facebook is configured 
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1. Introduction 
The changes undergone by political communication as a result of the introduction, extension, 
and consolidation of the Internet and social networks are still profound. Extended use of 
digital technologies has transformed political communication, giving rise to a mixed system 
in which old and new coexist and interrelate, thus generating a hybrid media system 
(Chadwick, 2017). 
Politicians who are most able to incorporate and adapt to digital media have gained a 
significant advantage over the rest (Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016). This feature of social media, 
which Castells (2009) has called “mass self-communication,” also allows the politician or 
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journalists’ mediation regarding their messages. In the digital milieu, the media can no longer 
monopolise selection and hierarchisation of politicians’ messages and neither can they frame 
them according to their own criteria. Hence, political leaders and parties have found that, 
without mediation by journalists, their opportunities for communicating directly with 
citizens have significantly increased. In this situation they can activate dynamics of self-
mediation to construct their political messages and directly convey them to citizens. 
Among those who are most assiduously using the self-mediation offered by self-
communication are populist political actors. They are resorting to social media to construct 
their discourse, achieve visibility, and address voters directly (Alonso-Muñoz & Casero-
Ripollés, 2018). Digital media are also being intensively used by populist leaders and parties 
(Alonso-Muñoz, 2019). They are thereby bringing about changes, introducing novelties into 
political communication, and imposing their own styles of communication (Jagers & 
Walgrave, 2007; de Vreese et al., 2018), which are enjoying more and more influence outside 
populism. 
The literature has traditionally focused on studying right-wing populist communication 
strategies (Krämer, 2017). However, recent times have brought a growing presence of left-
wing populist parties, especially in Spain. The aim of this study is to analyse how the mayor 
of Barcelona, Ada Colau, has constructed her political profile and discourse on Facebook. As 
a result, the main communicative elements of left-wing populist discourse can then be 
identified, and the way in which political leadership is shaped as an influencer in the digital 
milieu can be demonstrated. This analysis will therefore make original contributions to study 
of the interaction between political communication, the appearance of influencers, and 
populism in the digital environment. 
2. Populism: a slippery concept 
The term populism presents diffuse contours and its definition is complex. Despite, or perhaps 
partly because of this, it has been a much-used term in recent years, in both academic and 
conversational language. 
Regardless of the difficulty in grasping its meaning, the term populism usually has 
pejorative connotations and presents a negative dimension. It is probable that, together with 
other factors, this is related with the difficulty of positively evaluating the historical 
precedents that are used as a basis for classifying the phenomenon (Diamanti, 2010). This is 
so much the case that some authors see populism as a symptom of an alarming malaise 
afflicting the democratic system (Bobbio, 1987, pp. 23-42). 
Quite a large number of parties and movements are considered to be predecessors of, or 
historical references for contemporary populism. Amongst those that tend to be cited are the 
movement led by Louis Napoleon in France, the Russian Narodniks, the People’s Party in the 
United States, Italy’s Fronte dell’Uomo Qualunque (Common Man’s Front), the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico, and Peronism in Argentina. 
Among many other parties that could be cited as examples of contemporary right-wing 
populism are Front National in France, founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen, Forza Italia and Il 
Popolo della Libertà, founded by Silvio Berlusconi, the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP), and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Notable among left populist parties are the 
Movimiento Quinta República (MVR), founded by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Die Linke in 
Germany, and Podemos and BComú in Spain. 
One of the features of populism is that it is manifested, is incarnated, in ideologically very 
different and even conflicting phenomena. In this regard, Taggart (2000) draws attention to 
its chameleonic nature and the fact of its being able to appear in different periods and 
contexts. The notion of populism has been discussed for decades and many different 
definitions have been proposed. Hence, Canovan (1999), for example, concludes that it is a 
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notoriously vague term, while Mény and Surel (2002) refer to its constitutive ambiguity, and 
Taggart (2000) calls it a slippery concept. 
For present purposes we shall take Mudde’s definition: “a thin-centred ideology that 
considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 
‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an 
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (2004, p. 543). Freeden’s (1996) 
notion of “thin centered ideology,” should be understood as a simple, schematic, limited 
ideology that always appears in combination with others (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). 
Populism has been analysed from different perspectives. For some, it is basically a 
political ideology (Mudde, 2004), while for others it is a political strategy (Weyland, 2001). 
Populism has also been described as a communicative style (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; de 
Vreese et al., 2018). It is precisely this viewpoint that is most interesting for this study because 
of the fundamental importance acquired by communication in projects of the populist left, 
and the new context of opportunities opened up by the social media. 
Both left and right populism are fundamentally based on the distinction between the 
people and the elite. When populists refer to the people, they are implicitly or explicitly 
including some groups while at the same time excluding others. This dialectic is based on an 
us and a them, which harks back to Carl Schmitt’s friend-enemy scheme. 
The existence of a charismatic leader who seeks direct communication with the 
electorate is a characteristic that tends to appear with populist movements and parties. The 
populist leader who cultivates this relationship with an audience tends to address and appeal 
to followers speaking in first person plural (we) (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). Mudde (2004, 
p. 545), unlike other authors (Taggart, 2000; Weyland, 2001), believes that charismatic 
leadership “facilitates” populism rather than defining it. 
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) distinguish between two main typologies of 
contemporary populism: exclusionary and inclusionary. The former refers to the populism of 
the European radical right and the latter to Latin American left-wing populism. The groups 
that radical right-wing European populism seek to exclude are of a different type and have, 
in particular, a sociocultural ethnic-based dimension, which implies excluding people who 
are different. Latin American populism, by contrast, presents an inclusive, more 
socioeconomic dimension, based on including underprivileged people. 
3. The populist style of communication 
Jagers and Walgrave (2007) link populism with a certain style of communication, and there is 
considerable agreement with regard to identifying a populist style in the domain of political 
communication (de Vreese et al., 2018; Zulianello, Albertini & Ceccobelli, 2018; Block & 
Negrine, 2017; Casero-Ripollés, Sintes & Franch, 2017; Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Aalberg et 
al., 2016; Rooduijn, 2014). This has four components that fit with Mudde’s (2004) definition as 
well as with the typology of anti-political rhetoric described by Sorice (2013). 
The first is the communicative construction of the people which, at the same time, means 
a call to bring their interests to the fore when making decisions, as well as placing them at the 
centre of the political agenda. The second is anti-elitism, expressed in attacks on the political 
and economic elite, in particular, and the establishment in general. The third component is 
exclusion of other groups, which is evident in rejection of migrants and minorities. The fourth 
is crisis narrative, focused on criticism of the financial system, capitalism, and austerity 
policies (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Rooduijn, 2014). 
Also characteristic of populism is the resort to anti-political rhetoric (Sorice, 2013), which 
is defined as being emotional and as having a considerable capacity for whipping up passions 
rather than appealing to reason. These features then become ideal ingredients for the 
domains of the media and communication. 
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According to Sorice (2013, p. 23-36), there are four kinds of anti-political rhetoric. The 
first would be anti-system and aimed against the institutions and state organisation. The 
second is anti-state rhetoric against the central state, intrusive government, the tax-
collecting state, and judges. The third, anti-parliament rhetoric, attacks professional 
politicians, parties in the system, and journalists. Finally, the target of anti-intellectual 
rhetoric is academics, teachers, technology lovers, and civil servants. 
One of the resources of populist communication is opting for provocation and 
controversy, which can reach the point of self-scandalisation (Haller, 2015). Populism involves 
a theatrical kind of staging in which emotions, intimidation, breaking taboos, vulgarism, and 
negative affects prevail (Bracciale & Martella, 2017). Similarly, it tends to resort to 
ambivalence, giving out contradictory, ambiguous messages, or fearmongering (Wodak, 2015). 
4. Social media and populism 
The third age of political communication is marked by six tendencies: media abundance, 
intensified professionalisation of political communication, increased competitive pressures, 
a centrifugal process of diversification, changes in the ways people perceive politics, 
popularisation of anti-elitist stances, and populism (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999, p. 219). 
Expansion of the social media must also be added to this list since digital platforms offer 
numerous communicative opportunities for populism (Casero-Ripollés, Feenstra & Tormey, 
2016; Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018; Ernst et al., 2019). 
As Ernst et al. (2017) point out, populist politicians need direct access to citizens’ 
complaints, and this is provided by digital media. Second, social media offer populist 
politicians a fundamental element, which is to say the chance of having closer relations with 
these citizens (Kriesi, 2014, p. 363). Third, social media, and Facebook in particular, facilitate 
personalisation of messages by populist politicians. They can load them with emotivity, a 
common feature of their communicative style, as well as including personal perceptions and 
feelings in their messages or details of their everyday lives, and other information related, for 
example, with their families (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). 
Moreover, social media allow contact with specific groups, thus providing populists with 
the opportunity to use the harsh and often offensive language of many of their representatives 
(Engesser et al., 2017). Appeals to negative emotions like fear are part of the usual repertoire 
of populist discourse (Bracciale & Martella, 2017, Wodak, 2015; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). Social 
media make it possible to activate these communicative strategies for little economic cost, 
which tends to equalise the possibilities and opportunities of the established parties, and also 
those of new populist-style parties. 
Despite their importance and increasing centrality in the political scene, the forms of 
communication used by populist groups in social media have not yet been fully explored in 
the literature. 
5. The appearance of Barcelona en Comú (BComú) 
The onset of the economic crisis in 2008 had a great impact on the Spanish economy with an 
enormous rise in unemployment, generalised austerity policies, and serious deterioration of 
living conditions for citizens. This was the background that gave rise to the coalition 
Barcelona en Comú (BComú). Both the economic crisis and the 15M rebellion played key roles 
in its appearance. The latter was a social movement which arose in 2011 when demonstrations 
and protests were held in several cities, Barcelona among them. 15M or the Indignados 
Movement called for greater citizen participation in decision-making processes, renewal of 
the Spanish political system, redefinition of political representation, and more limited power 
of banks and powerful financial institutions (Calvo, Gómez-Pastrana & Mena, 2011; Castells, 
2015). 
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Online communication and mobilisation played key roles on this movement (Micó & 
Casero-Ripollés, 2014), which was influenced inter alia by anti-globalisation organisations, 
the so-called Arab Spring movements, and mass protests in Iceland. In turn, 15M inspired 
other protests like #Occupy in the United States and United Kingdom, as well as leading to 
the appearance of new political parties. Especially notable among these are Podemos, led by 
Pablo Iglesias, and BComú, which is headed by Ada Colau (Feenstra et al., 2017). 
BComú ran in the local elections backed by a coalition agreement presented on 10 
February and consisting of the following groups: Guanyem Barcelona [Ganemos Barcelona] 
(the platform led by Ada Colau), Podemos (the new Spanish party arising from 15M or the 
Indignados Movement); Iniciativa por Cataluña-Verdes and Izquierda Unida y Alternativa 
(successors of the old communist parties of Catalonia and Spain); Procés Constituent (left 
pro-independence party), and Equo (left-wing ecologist party). The coalition was also 
supported by several left-wing social movements and citizens, as well as eminent figures from 
university and cultural circles. 
BComú’s candidate to stand for mayor of Barcelona was Ada Colau. She was already 
prominent as leader and spokesperson of the anti-eviction movement Plataforma de 
Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH – Platform for People Affected by Mortgages), a very active 
group combatting evictions and campaigning for the right to housing with considerable 
repercussion in the mainstream media (Alonso-Muñoz & Casero-Ripollés, 2016). 
After the restoration of democracy in Spain, Barcelona had been governed from 1979 to 
2011 by the Catalan branch of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE – Spanish Socialist 
Workers Party) and Partido de los Socialistas de Cataluña (PSC – Socialist Party of Catalonia), 
with the support of other left-wing parties. In 2011, the centre-right nationalist coalition 
Convergència i Unió (CiU – Convergence and Union) won the mayor’s office for the first time. 
In the elections of 24 May 2015, CiU started out as favourite but Ada Colau and BComú 
won by a very small margin –just over 17,000 votes– after an intense electoral campaign. With 
almost 177,000 votes, Colau achieved eleven of the forty-one local government 
representatives, by comparison with the ten gained by CiU. With these results she became 
mayor of Barcelona, thanks to support from other left-wing parties. 
In terms of people who make most use of social media, the citizens who voted for Colau 
appear as being second only to those who voted for the anti-system party Candidatura de 
Unidad Popular (CUP – Popular Unity Candidacy) (García-Carretero & Pérez-Altable, 2017; 
García-Carretero & Díaz-Noci, 2018; CIS, 2015). This group of voters also sent the largest 
number of mobile messages, SMSs, posts, and tweets about the elections. This evidence 
underscores the importance of digital communication for the social bases of the populist left. 
6. Aims and methodology 
The aims of the study are as follows: 
1. To analyse the discourse in Facebook posts by the Mayor of Barcelona, Ada Colau, 
giving special attention to the use of elements linked with the populist style of 
communication. 
2. Analyse how the Mayor of Barcelona, Ada Colau, has used Facebook to construct her 
profile as an alternative political leader and a digital influencer. 
This will make it possible to identify the main elements of communication in left-wing 
populist discourse and to show how political leadership and influence are constructed in the 
digital realm. 
The methodology is based on quantitative content analysis, considering categories like 
frequency of Facebook posts by year and month in the period studied. Frequency of use of 
different languages in the Facebook posts is also studied. Hence, posts in Spanish and Catalan 
have been taken into account, together with those published in both languages (Spanish and 
Catalan), others published in English, and posts in all three languages (Spanish, Catalan and 
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English). Finally, the posts have been classified according to whether photographs, videos, 
documents, or links to websites have been incorporated and, in the latter case, identifying the 
source. 
Furthermore, Colau’s tone has been studied in her Facebook posts (positive, negative, or 
neutral) and a process of content classification based on grounded theory (Miles & Huberman, 
1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) has been carried out. As a result, several categories of analysis 
based on observation of the data have been created (see Table 1). As for content, the 
characteristics pertaining to anti-political rhetoric established by Sorice (2013) have been 
taken as defining elements of the populist communicative style. The following categories have 
been created as a constitutive part of this anti-political rhetoric: anti-system rhetoric with two 
distinct subcategories to refer to mentions of capitalism and big corporations; anti-state 
rhetoric, with the sub-categories of central state, intrusive government, tax-collecting state, 
and judges; anti-parliament rhetoric with specific sub-categories for considering allusions to 
politicians and parties; and anti-intellectual rhetoric in which the sub-categories of 
intellectuals, technology lovers, civil servants, and journalists have been established. 
Furthermore, in keeping with the communicative populist style defined by Jagers and 
Walgrave (2007), basic elements in constructing the crisis narrative have been identified, 
especially allusions to the financial system, capitalism and austerity policies. In keeping with 
the framework of Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013), a distinction between inclusionary and 
exclusionary populism has been established. Within the category of inclusionary populism, 
the following sub-categories have been identified: evicted people, immigrants, refugees, 
poverty, energy poverty, child malnutrition/child poverty, women, while a further sub-
category has been included, this time identifying the publications in which Colau criticises 
people who, in her view exclude others. 
With regard to the form of populist communicative style, the following headings are used: 
messianic leadership (in keeping with Stockemer & Barisione, 2016); the communicative 
construction of “the people” (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007); provocation and controversy, self-
scandalisation, and emotionalising, to use Haller’s concepts (2005); ambivalence, 
contradiction, and ambiguity (Wodak, 2015); and fearmongering (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; 
Wodak, 2015). 
Finally, after analysing the content of Colau’s posts, a list of thirty words has been 
produced in order to determine their frequency of appearance in the period analysed (see 
Table 2). 
The sample consists of all the posts published on Facebook by Ada Colau between 13 June 
2015 and 13 June 2017. This period covers the beginning of her mandate as mayor, or her first 
two years governing the city. In total, 226 Facebook posts have been studied by means of a 
process of manual codification. In order to guarantee the accuracy of the process, 23.45% of 
the posts have been analysed by two coders. Intercoder reliability, according to Scott’s Pi was 
0.90. 
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Table 1: Categories in the model of analysis of Facebook posts by the Mayor of 
Barcelona, Ada Colau. 
TYPOLOGY OF POST 
Photograph Video Document Link to website Source 
TONE 
Positive Negative Neutral Not classified 
CONTENT 
ANTI-POLITICAL RHETORIC (SORICE, 2013) 
Anti-System 
Capitalism Big corporations 
Anti-State 




Journalists Intellectuals Teachers 
POPULIST COMMUNICATVE STYLE (JAGERS AND WALGRAVE, 2007) 
Crisis narrative  
Financial system Capitalism Austerity policies 
OTHER ARGUMENTS/ACTORS 
Tourism Big landowners Laicism 
INCLUSIONARY POPULISM (MUDDE AND ROVIRA KALTWASSER, 2013) 


























(Haller, 2015)  
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Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table 2: Key words analysed in Facebook posts by the Mayor of Barcelona, Ada Colau. 
Key words 
Austerity 
Change (noun), change (verb) 
Citizenship, citizens, men and women citizens 
Corruption, corrupt 











Black Cards (corruption scandal) 
Transparency, transparent 
Eviction(s) 
Cuts, cutting (social spending) 
Emergency, housing emergency 
PAH 
“Sí se puede” (Yes, We Can) 
Housing, empty houses, empty flat(s) 
Public rental 
Real-estate bubble/speculation, speculative surge, speculation 
Apartment/tourist accommodation, illegal apartments, tourist flats 
Tourism, tourist model 
Abuses, abuse of power 
Source: Own elaboration. 
7. Results 
7.1. Frequency of publication, use of languages and links 
The total number of Ada Colau’s Facebook posts during the period analysed was 226, 33.19% 
(n=75) of which were published in 2015, 46.46% (n=105) in 2016, and 20.35% (n=46) in 2017. As 
for frequency of publication, there has been a downwards trend since the average number of 
messages per month in 2015 was 10.71, while in 2016 and 2017 it was 8.83 and 7.66 respectively. 
As for language, Colau uses Spanish in 83.19% (n=188) of her Facebook posts. Although 
Catalan is the co-official language in Catalonia, it is only used in 7.96% of her messages (n=18), 
while 3.54% (n=8) of the posts appeared in both languages, 2.21% (n=5) in English, and 0.44% 
(n=1) in all three languages (Spanish, Catalan, and English). The remaining six posts (2.65%) 
have profile or other images but no text. The predominant use of Spanish and emerging use 
of English reveals a desire for expansion in both the radius of circulation of her messages and 
with her potential audience. Although her sphere of political action is local, Colau thereby 
reveals her interest in achieving a political presence in both the national and international 
spheres. 
Of the links used, 8.85% (n=20) are for photos or videos, 0.44%, a political document (n=1), 
and 7.08% (n=16) are for websites of the Spanish media. Notable among the media links are 
the newspapers El País and El Periódico de Catalunya, representatives of the elite press and 
tabloids respectively, with 2.65% (n=6) and 1.77% (n=4) of the links respectively. 
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7.2. Tone of the posts and inclusionary discourse 
The results suggest that most Facebook messages posted by Colau, 58.85% (n=133), are positive 
in tone and 34.96% (n=79) are negative. Only 3.54% (n=8) of the posts are neutral and another 
2.65% (n=6) have not been classified as they are simply concerned with a change in image of 
the user profile. These results reveal that Colau habitually takes sides on Facebook showing 
her position on different matters. In addition, she frequently does so in a positive tone, which 
seeks to obtain a favourable impact among the recipients of her messages. 
Moreover, the results show considerable overlap between Colau’s messages on Facebook 
and the elements characterising inclusionary populism (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). 
The posts that can be grouped under this heading amount to a total of 58.40% (n=132). By 
contrast, no Facebook post by Colau that could be classified as exclusionary populism has 
been found. 
Notable among the groups with which, on Facebook, Colau shows her solidarity and 
emphasises inclusion are people who have been evicted from their homes (Graph 1). She 
mentions them in 17.26% (n=39) of her messages. Next come women (12.39%; n=28), refugees 
(11.06%; n=25), and people affected by poverty (9.73%; n=22). An example in which she is 
concerned with refugees is given in the following post of 6 April 2016: 
Cities are organised to weave alliances and offer themselves as places of refuge in the face 
of shameful inaction of European states whose policies are complicit in thousands of 
deaths in the Mediterranean. Cities can and want to offer refuge. The United Nations has 
praised our offer. What more can we do to get them to listen to us? 
Here, Colau is stressing her concept of cities as havens for refugees, even using the United 
Nations as a reference of authority and discursive mechanism for legitimating and supporting 
her position. 
At the same time, she criticises the inertia of states, which she describes as “shameful,” 
while also accusing them of being complicit in the deaths of refugees. She thus uses the 
populist rhetoric that distinguishes between the people and the elites, them and us, arraying 
herself in positive values (welcome and solidarity) and situating states in a negative sphere by 
attributing guilt. 
Nevertheless, Colau goes a little further in her Facebook statements since she does not 
spare from censure those she seems to be lacking in solidarity or having exclusionary 
attitudes, to whom she devotes 7.96% (n=18) of her messages. 
One example is the following post where Colau inveighs against the Ciudadanos (C’s) 
party and its leader, Albert Rivera, over their position regarding home evictions: 
Cs is still not listening to the citizens. With everything that has happened, it still has not 
heeded the demands of the PAH (where, yes, they are experts and, yes, they do know about 
evictions), which are very clear demands for a halt to evictions reallocating social housing 
in cases of retroactive dation in payment. C’s does not include these measures in its 
programme and neither does it support them. It supports the banks and the large IBEX 
companies and has the nerve to say at its meetings, ‘Yes, we can’. Mister Rivera, if you 
want to shout Yes, We Can, then stand in front of the houses and do it. Stick your neck 
out, like half the country has done, facing the police and facing the banks (13 December 
2015). 
Once again, Colau uses the people-elite dichotomy to criticize her political rivals. She 
presents herself as part of the people and places Ciudadanos and its leader, Albert Rivera, as 
upholders of the establishment, and as championing banks in particular. 
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Graph 1: Inclusionary populism. Groups with which solidarity or need for inclusion is 
shown, and criticisms of lack of solidarity. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Construction of leadership and the communicative construction of “the people” are two 
essential features of populism. Colau’s Facebook posts conform to both, although those that 
seek to construct her leadership predominate, with 61.06% (n=138) of the total. One example 
would be a post of 19 January 2016, where she shows her commitment to oppose abusive 
clauses in mortgage contracts, and also to emphasise the leadership she is showing in the 
administration: 
I have spent many years reading mortgage contracts full of abusive clauses. Now, 
fortunately, we are in a position where we can influence agreements with financial 
institutions, introducing clauses that benefit people instead of working against them. If 
they wish to work with the City Council, they must not forget that no private interest can 
come before human rights and the common good. We are proud to ensure that the 
priorities of such an important institution as the Barcelona City Council will help to 
encourage good practice in the financial sector, as in any other sector. We are gradually 
showing that, if you want to do it, you can. We won’t be able to do everything in a few 
months, but we are achieving things and we shall announce more results in the coming 
months. We shall always keep forging ahead, despite the difficulties, and we will not forget 
who we are or why we are here. 
However, the effort given to the communicative construction of the people is less since only 
15.49% (n=35) of her posts have this focus. One example of Colau’s strategy is a post of 8 
December 2015: 
[...] We are recovering the institutions to place them at the service of the common good, 
giving a major role to citizens in ending corruption, privileges, and abuse of power. This 
is a source of enormous pride. Thank you, Pablo. I have also woken up smiling :-) 
#IglesiasPresidente20D #Remontada. 
Colau draws attention to the prominence and key role played by citizens in political life while, 
at the same time, constructing an epic account of her leadership by linking it with eradicating 
corruption and abuse of power, and recovering political institutions to place them at the 
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In her rhetoric, she uses several resources related with emotions (Graph 2), among them 
self-scandalisation (41.15%: n=93), emotivity (40,27%; n=91), and provocation and controversy 
(34.96%; n=79), all of which appear with high percentages in her Facebook posts. Fear has a 
small presence (4.87%: n=11) and she does not use ambivalence or resort to contradictions and 
ambiguities. 
 
Graph 2: Populist rhetoric in posts by Ada Colau. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
7.3. Anti-political rhetoric 
Notable in the anti-political rhetoric (Sorice, 2013) employed by Colau (Graph 3) are her 
criticism of capitalism (14.60%; n=33) and the big corporations (8.85%; n=20), and also of 
politicians (6.19%; n=14), political elites (21.24%; n=48), parties (13.72%; n=31), and the state 
(12.39%; n=28). Journalists are mentioned in a total of 7.96% (n=18) of the posts. There is only 
one post each for intellectuals and civil servants. All in all, this means that the predominant 
typologies are anti-system and anti-parliament rhetoric. 
Colau’s Facebook references to the crisis (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) are infrequent. When 
she uses this formula, she cites the financial system in 7.96% (n=18) of her posts, capitalism in 
9.73% (n=22), while her references to austerity policies account for 7.08% (n=16) of the total. 
Colau goes still further in her posts, writing about other actors and problems that are 
not detected in earlier literature about populist communication, namely problems caused by 
tourism, which appear in 3.98% (n=9) of her posts, and laicism, in 1.33% (n=3). Moreover, 4.42% 
(n=10) of her posts condemn big property owners in the housing sector and she blames them 
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Graph 3: Criticisms aimed at different actors. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
With the aim of offering a more precise definition of the characteristics of Colau’s political 
communication through Facebook, a complementary set of key words associated with the 
communicative style of populism is also offered (Table 2). These key words were taken from 
Colau’s Facebook posts, after which their frequency was quantified. 
In this regard, seven words and their corresponding derivates –also verbal– are liberally 
employed by Colau: change (34.96%; n=79), democracy (23.45%; n=53), citizenry (16.81%; n=38), 
eviction (16.37%; n=37), refugees (13.27%; n=30), corruption (11.50%; n=26), and PAH –Platform 
for People Affected by Mortgages Hipoteca– (9,73%; n=22). It should be noted that this final 
term is intimately related with the third key word (eviction), which once again shows that 
Colau situates the problem of housing as one of her major concerns as mayor of Barcelona. 
8. Conclusions 
The findings of this study present new ideas for research into the relationship between 
communication and populism. In particular, it has allowed identification, within the domain 
of the populist style of political communication, of a new specific modality focused on 
inclusion as a key theme. In other words, this is inclusionary populist communication. 
Facebook posts by the Mayor of Barcelona, Ada Colau, belong to this type of communicative 
strategy which aims to focus political debate on the weaker social groups and defence of their 
rights. 
In her Facebook posts, Colau uses several classical elements of the populist style of 
communication (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; García-Carretero & Díaz-Noci, 2018). Hence, her 
messages appeal to the communicative construction of “the people” as a key element of her 
political discourse. Indeed, she includes herself as one of “the people.” At the same time, she 
fiercely criticises the establishment, especially its political and economic sectors. Her use of 
elements of anti-political rhetoric (Sorice, 2013) is conspicuous, especially anti-system 
rhetoric, against the big corporations and banks, as is her anti-parliamentary rhetoric, against 
parties and traditional political actors. Attacks on political and economic elites therefore 
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parties, she devotes considerable attention to economic populism (Bernhard & Kriesi, 2019). 
Criticism of capitalism, the financial system, banks as generators of inequalities and social 
injustice is one of the core elements of her discourse in this digital platform. She also employs 
narrative of the crisis, although to a lesser extent. 
The novel, distinctive element of Colau’s communicative strategy on Facebook is her 
approach to relationship with others. In line with what the literature identifies (Casero-
Ripollés et al., 2017), the Mayor of Barcelona, like other left-wing populists, for example 
representatives of Podemos, does not resort to excluding “the others” and is therefore different 
from exponents of far-right populism and their emphasis on xenophobic discourse and anti-
immigration rhetoric (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Krämer, 2017). By contrast, Colau 
opts for inclusionary populist communication in her Facebook posts. This strategy is observed 
in her considerable use of an inclusive narrative (in 58.40% of her posts). 
Her concern with inclusive issues–basically right to housing, immigration, poverty, and 
women’s rights–is very prominent in her publications and, with the thrust of these issues, her 
posts focus attention on defence of minorities, the weakest social groups like evicted people 
who have become homeless, women victims of gender violence, and refugees. All this fits into 
the framework of solidarity with others. Colau’s communicative style goes beyond the 
populist practice of defence of ordinary people to take the struggle into the terrain of 
defending the most vulnerable and fragile members of society. Her strategy is to speak out in 
defence of minorities and the most defenceless groups in order to promote social justice. 
In addition, the inclusionary populism employed by Colau is manifested in the languages 
she uses for her Facebook posts. She mainly uses Spanish, despite the importance in 
Barcelona of Catalan –the language of Catalonia– and English. She is thereby trying to ensure 
that her digital discourse will appeal to a political community that is wider than the city she 
governs, and that her communicative strategy will have some influence in the state and even 
international domains rather than being restricted to the local terrain. In this case, she relates 
with the universalism characterising inclusionary populism (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 
2013), which aims to expand to the maximum the mass base of politics. 
Inclusionary populist communication also appears in the use Colau makes of Facebook 
to construct her profile as a political leader. First, she clearly opts for a strategy of advocacy, 
supporting the weaker social groups and causes in order to include and situate them at the 
centre of public debate. Her position is therefore far from being one of neutrality, which is 
limited to 3.54% of her posts. This use of advocacy is combined with a predominantly positive 
tone (58.85% of the total), leaving little space for emotions like fear. Hence, Colau is trying to 
connect more effectively with “the people,” to include the more disadvantaged members of 
society in a relevant political space, and to constitute herself as a leader who is able to make 
positive proposals. 
Colau also incorporates Facebook as an everyday tool of her communicative strategy. It 
is especially significant that the greatest intensity of posts is to be found at the beginning of 
her mandate as mayor, precisely when she is constructing her leadership by means of the 
self-communication facilitated by this online platform. With these frequent posts, combined 
with her use of Facebook as a mechanism of positive advocacy in favour of inclusion, Colau 
employs it as a way of generating influence beyond the city when aspiring to shape herself as 
a political influencer. Likewise, this objective becomes patent in the accessible, familiar 
language she uses when addressing the public. 
Colau’s communicative strategy via Facebook is interesting because she manages to 
expand the repertoire of the populist style of political communication. This case highlights 
the existence within it of several variants and typologies, which would support the argument 
that, in terms of communication, populism is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. One of 
these facets is inclusionary populist communication, which focuses the discursive strategy on 
inclusion, social justice, and solidarity with the weaker members of society. Populism, using 
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the social media, thus tries to connect with “the people,” starting from an inclusionary logic 
that situates the most fragile, disadvantaged groups at the centre of political debate, thereby 
producing a strategy that innovatively hybridises politics and communication in such a way 
as to expand the populist communicative style into new frameworks linked with the domain 
of social inclusion. 
 
This study is part of the research project CSO2017-88620-P, which is funded by the Spanish 
Government’s Agencia Estatal de Investigación del Estado (AEI – State Research Agency) under the 
auspices of the National R+D+I Plan. 
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